The Radicalizing Effect of the Cold War on Union Politics of Railway Workers

A Paper Presented at 21st Annual North American Labor History Conference

This paper examines the impact of the Cold War on the internal politics of Kokuro, the Japan National Railway Workers' Union, from 1947 to 1951. Kokuro organized workers of the Japan National Railways (JNR) and was one of the largest and most influential unions in the early postwar period. The paper analyzes internal union politics as well as their external contexts, especially state labor policies (including those of Supreme Commander Allied Powers or SCAP).

The paper covers the period when internal union politics were volatile due to the influence of the Cold War. More specifically, it examines the period between the formation of the anti-Communist faction within Kokuro in the late 1947 and its eventual split in the mid-1951 over the issue of Japan's postwar peace treaty. This period can be seen as a "critical juncture" in the union history in the sense that the result of union politics formed a basis of the subsequent development of the union's militant policy orientations. The paper shows the discourse of the union politics was shaped by the Cold War in two different ways. In the period between October 1947 and July 1949, union politics were characterized by the direct confrontation between Communists and anti-Communists. After Communists were purged from the union in July 1949, union politics were characterized by disagreements within the anti-Communist faction over Japan's position in the Cold War after the independence of Japan from the U.S. Occupation.

The main argument of the paper is that the Cold War had a radicalizing effect on Kokuro. It caused the split within the anti-Communist faction in 1951, in which the leftist faction was victorious. The paper argues that the Cold War gave rise to a strong anti-war feeling among union members, and that their anti-war feeling in addition to their economic grievances played an important role in the left-turn of Kokuro. In other words, union members were motivated not only by their economic interests, but by their political consciousness in their support for the left-turn of the union.

(1) Brief History of JNR and the Labor Movement of JNR Workers until the Late 1947¹

The Japanese government purchased private railways and established Japan National Railways in 1906, because railways became increasingly important for efficient transportation of military forces. Until 1949, JNR had been a state-owned enterprise, operated directly by the Ministry of Railways. In 1949, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to reorganize JNR into a public corporation, making it formally independent from the state control.

(1-1) Pre-War Period

In1920, locomotive drivers and other workers of JNR established the first labor union, but the union was forced to dissolve in ten months due to the repression of the JNR management backed by police forces. In order to counter the rise of the union movement among JNR workers, the JNR management established the system of worker-management workplace committees (gengo iinnkai) in 1920 in which elected representatives of workers expressed their opinions to management. In 1926, JNR workers reorganized some of workers' associations that represented their opinions in workplace committees into a union. However, the union quickly took left-turn, and was forced to dissolve by management within one year. From 1927 to 1935, there were several attempts to organize JNR workers under the direction of the Communists-led federation (Zenkyo), but these attempts were severely repressed by management and the state. In 1941, worker-management workplace committees were abolished, and all JNR employees compulsorily became members of a wartime mobilization organization called Kokuyu Tetsudo Hokokai.

(1-2) The Early Post-War Period

In the late 1945, Labor Union Law was enacted by SCAP as part of postwar reforms, and labor unions were legalized. JNR workers all over Japan started to form regional or workplace-based unions from November 1945. Although the JNR management tried to counter the move of JNR workers to form independent unions by reviving the system of workplace committees, such an attempt did not succeed. In February 1946, a national-level union was organized as a federation of autonomous regional unions (Kokutetsu Soren). In June 1947, Kokuro was established as a centralized union to replace its decentralized predecessor. Kokuro's membership at the time of formation was about 600,000.

Open criticisms against Communists started after the cancellation of general strikes planned in February 1, 1947 under the leadership of Sanbetsu Kaigi (Japan Council of Industrial Unions, the Communists-dominated confederation of unions). The planned strikes were banned by SCAP. Many union members became critical of the forceful way that several Communist leaders led the union in preparation for the planed strikes. In the convention of Kokutetsu Soren held in the next month, a delegate made a motion to "exclude Communists from union offices." The convention decided to discuss the motion, but decided not to put it to vote in order to maintain the unity of the union (Endo 1954: 190).

(2) From the Formation of the Anti-Communist Faction to the Red Purge under the Mass Dismissal²

(2-1) Factionalizatoin of the Union along the Cold War Line

Kokuro started to be factionalized along the Cold War line during and after its second convention in October 1947. The executive committee dominated by anti- or non-Communists submitted moderate policy proposals to the convention for approval. However, most policy proposals were defeated, and delegates approved militant policies submitted by Communists. The two most contentious issues were wage policies and the method of struggles. Concerning the first issue, Communists advocated a wage system that was more egalitarian and set a higher criterion of living wages than the system proposed by the executive committee. Concerning the second issue, while the executive committee took the position that only the union headquarters would order union members to engage in struggles, the position of Communists was that union locals would autonomously order union members to engage in struggles. In response to the disapproval of the policy proposals, the executive committee voted to resign in a body. Because of this, the convention floor was thrown into great confusion, and the chairman (an anti-Communist) called off the convention, thus nullifying the decisions made by delegates. Anti- and non-Communists delegates and officials then walked out from the convention floor, and formed Hankyo Renmei (the Anti-Communist League). It later changed its name to Mindo or the Democratization League.

Hankyo Renmei (Mindo) emphasized the necessity of making the union free from any outside influence, and called for the exclusion of Communists from union offices (Endo 1954: 197). Those who played a leading role in the formation of the anti-Communists faction were senior workers in lower managerial positions who held a strong enterprise consciousness (ibid.: 195-6). The faction also included relatively young union members who opposed the forceful way that Communists ran the union, but would later begin to oppose the red-baiting of some senior leaders (Murakami 1981). While union politics led to the formation of the anti-Communist faction, the union's external contexts also provided favorable environments for it. SCAP, which had avoided open criticism of Communists in Kokuro, began to openly attack them. For example, J. Harold, a member of Labor Section, made a speech to the second convention of Kokuro, and stated that puppets of the Communists party were obstructing the construction of a democratic union movement of JNR workers (Ariga 1978: 172-3).³

Mindo established the dominance within the union in the third convention in March 1948, and turned the union in the moderate direction. However, the dominance of Mindo did not last long, because the third faction, Kakudo (Progressive Comrades Association), was formed in April 1948 as a middle force in the political spectrum. Kakudo was formed by those who became antagonistic to Mindo that started to run the union in a dictatorial way as Communists had done. The faction also included "opportunists" who took advantage of it to get elected to union offices as well as some pro-Communists (Endo 1954: 199-200). Kakudo tried to take policies unbiased by either pro- or anti-Communist ideologies in the beginning, but later approached Communists (Ariga 1978: 190). Mindo was defeated in union elections in preparation for the fourth union convention. The proportion of Mindo within the Central Committee⁴ decreased from 64 percent to 41 percent, because votes previously cast for Mindo went to Kakudo (ibid.: 184, 194-5).

In the fourth convention, Kokuro again took a left-turn, because Kakudo formed an alliance with Communists. The convention adopted militant policies, such as the wage demand of 5,200 yen in line with that of Zenkanko, the federation of public-sector unions affiliated with the Communist-dominated Sanbetsu Kaigi (Kokuro was not affiliated with Sanbetsu Kaigi), and the revival of the autonomous right of locals to engage in struggles.

(2-2) Kokuro's Reaction to Radical Changes in its External Contexts

The context of the labor movement of JNR workers radically changed from the mid-1948 to the mid-1949. In July 1948, the Japanese government issued an ordinance (the so-called ordinance No.201) based on a direction from General MacArthur.⁵ The ordinance restricted the right of public-sector workers to engage in collective bargaining and banned their right to engage in strikes (when JNR became a public corporation in June 1949, the right of JNR workers to engage in collective bargaining was restored). In addition, in July 1949, the JNR management dismissed 93,700 employees as part of an austere economic policy, called "the Dodge Plan," that aimed to contain inflation and to realize a balanced budget. Under this policy, the total of 260,000 government workers were dismissed, and GS (Government Section) of SCAP secretly instructed the Japanese government to heavily target Communists in dismissing workers (Takemae 1982: 349-50). Thus, the mass dismissal of JNR became a virtual Red Purge.

The government ordinance to severely restrict industrial rights of public-sector workers intensified factional conflicts within Kokuro. The three factions of Kokuro reacted to it in different ways. While Mindo accepted the ordinance, Communists took the position that, since industrial rights of workers were guaranteed by the Constitution of Japan, the ordinance would not become immediately binding. Kakudo did not take any specific position on the ordinance. The executive committee engaged in lengthy debate over how the union should respond, and decided to issue "the emergency declaration" to union members by majority votes of Communists and Kakudo (Mindo opposed the declaration). The declaration, while avoiding directly criticizing SCAP, attacked the Japanese government for repressing industrial rights of public-sector workers in violation of the Postdam Declaration and the Constitution of Japan. It furthermore stated that the repression of industrial rights would contribute to the revival of the pre-1945 labor and political regimes characterized by fascism and totalitarianism. Mindo, critical of the position of the executive committee, adopted its own declaration. The Mindo declaration stated that, since the authority of SCAP was above that of the Japanese government and therefore absolute, the union should respect the government ordinance based on the MacArthur's direction. It also held Communists responsible for creating such a serious situation of public-sector workers, and called for union members to thoroughly criticize the emergency declaration and the one-sided propaganda of Communists in union meetings (Kokutetsu 1959: 310-11). Thus, locals and their workplace units received the conflicting messages from union leaders. Some locals adopted resolutions to respect the emergency declaration of the executive committee, while others rejected it based on the Mindo's guidance.⁶

The inability of the executive committee (dominated by Communists and Kakudo) to make unified responses to the sudden change in its environment became an issue in the fifth convention of Kokuro held in September 1948. Mindo proposed a motion of non-confidence in the executive committee dominated by Communists, and delegates approved the motion. The convention selected a new executive committee dominated by Mindo, and approved a resolution that the union would respect the government ordinance and engage in a "sound" union activities.

The right-turn of the union, however, was reversed again when Communists and Kakudo (particularly the former) won union elections in preparation for the sixth convention in April 1949. Two factors accounted for another left-turn of the union. First, Communists and Kakudo took a militant position against the impending large-scale reduction of public-sector workers under the austere economic policy of the government, which seemed to appeal to JNR workers who became concerned about their job security (Ariga 1978: 244). Second, Communists increased their influence in the national politics. In the general election held in January 1949, the JCP (the Japan Communist Party) increased its seats from 4 to 35, while the JSP (the Japan Socialist Party), the party supported by Mindo, suffered from a heavy loss.

In May, the National Diet passed a law limiting the number of public-sector employees (Tein Ho), thus giving the JNR management a legal foundation to dismiss its employees. The central committee of Kokuro debated how the union should respond to the dismissal: while leftists (Communists and Kakudo) insisted that the union should engage in strikes in order to prevent the dismissal, Mindo insisted that the union should engage in anti-dismissal struggles within the legal framework. Because of the factional balance in favor of leftists, the central committee adopted a policy that the union would engage in strikes when a collective bargaining with management was broke off (Kokutetsu 1960: 69-71).

The collective bargaining with the JNR management over the mass dismissal was soon broke off. Kokuro gave a warning of possible strikes to the JNR management, and directed its locals to prepare for "the worst possible condition." In July, the mass dismissal started, and Communists were heavily targeted. Among 198 dismissed union officials, 8 and 25 belonged to Mindo and Kakudo, respectively, while 156 belonged to the Communist faction. In the executive committee (consisting of 36 members), all 11 Communists and 6 out of 10 members affiliated with Kakudo were dismissed (none of members affiliated with Mindo were dismissed).⁷ The JNR management, as a reason for the dismissal of these members of the executive committee, stated that they refused to cooperate in the smooth and safe operation of JNR by instigating rank and file members to engage in illegal strikes and by oppressing "moderate and sound elements" within the union (Endo 1954: 215; Kokutetsu 1960: 102-4). Kokuro did not stage strikes or other large-scale actions in protest of the mass dismissal (except sporadic protest actions at the workplace level), and the mass dismissal was carried out relatively smoothly. This was not only because union leaders affiliated with Mindo strongly opposed the strike-based policy, but also because the public opinion became increasingly hostile to the union. The hostile public opinion was due to the suspected involvement of Communist Kokuro members in Mitaka and Matsukawa incidents.⁸

Mindo took advantage of the mass dismissal to capture the leadership of the union from leftists. 13 members of the executive committee affiliated with Mindo refused to recognize the dismissed leftist members of the committee as union members. They insisted that a central committee meeting should be held only by those who were not dismissed in order to select replacements for the dismissed leaders. The central committee meeting held in August cancelled the strike-based strategy, and adopted a policy that the union would engage in struggles within the legal framework. The meeting also selected a new executive committee, in which 22 out of 25 members were affiliated with Mindo. The seventh union convention in October reaffirmed the moderate policy line, and adopted a plan to engage in struggles for the improvement of the economic interests of union members. The convention also decided that the union would join ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).

In this way, Kokuro, under the dominance of Mindo, rid itself of Communists and other leftists, and shifted its policy orientation from political unionism to economic unionism within the legal framework. However, the union was not able to take the latter strategy for a long time, because it found it increasingly difficult to win wage increases within the existing legal framework (see Section 3).

(2-3) Analysis

The above account suggests two characteristics of union politics of Kokuro in this period. First, the three factions engaged in politics mainly over concrete union strategies (i.e., whether the union should engage in union activities in centralized or decentralized ways, and whether the union should respect the ban on strikes or disobey it if necessary), rather than issues directly related to the Cold War such as foreign policies. The relative neglect of foreign policy issues can be explained by the fact that Japan was under the U.S. Occupation and did not have any autonomy in its foreign policies. This sharply contrasts with the union politics in the subsequent period (1949-1951) when the approach of Japan's independence from the U.S. Occupation activated foreign policy debate within Kokuro. Second, the union politics of Kokuro in this period was very volatile, making a pendulum-like movement between left and right. There were two possible reasons. First, Kokuro occupied a strategic position in the Japanese economy for its potential for disrupting the nation-wide network of train services. Thus, the union was subject to interference and/or pressures from outside forces that included political parties such as the JCP and the JSP as well as SCAP and the Japanese government (see Endo 1954: 189). The "tug-of-war" among outside forces seemed to explain the volatile factional politics within the union. Second, it seemed that many rank and file members were strongly dissatisfied with low wages and poor working conditions, and expected the union leadership to achieve immediate results such as increase in real wages. Mindo tried to consolidate its dominance by appealing to the "enterprise as a family" consciousness of union members (Ibid.: 201). However, such an appeal was not sufficient. It seemed that if the faction did not achieve any concrete economic result, many union members shifted their support to Communists or Kakudo in union elections. And if policies of Communists were not successful in achieving a concrete economic result, union members seemed to shift their support back to Mindo.

(3) The Dominance and Split of Mindo⁹

Mindo re-established its dominance within Kokuro in the central committee meeting in August 1949. In the central committee meeting in January 1950, it further increased its influence in the union, taking all but one seats of the executive committee. Moreover, the remaining influence of Communists was wiped out from the union by the Red Purge in the late 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, SCAP and the Japanese government repressed activities of the JCP, and ordered the purge of Communists and their sympathizers from the government, public corporations, and private enterprises. In the case of JNR, 467 workers were dismissed. In addition, Mindo in Kokuro and other anti-Communist forces were unified into a new confederation, Sohyo, in July 1950. Sohyo established a dominant position in the labor movement: it organized 2,760,000 workers, or 48 percent of organized labor (Sanbetsu Kaigi and other pro-Communist unions represented 13 percent of organized labor).

In spite of the seemingly favorable conditions, Mindo was split between the left and right factions in the 10th union convention in June 1951. Two factors contributed to the development of internal division: (1) the arbitration system under the PCNELR Law did not function smoothly, and (2) the faction was divided over Kokuro's attitude toward issues related to the Cold War, especially the postwar peace treaty.

(3-1) Imperfect implementation of the PCNELR Law and Kokuro's Reactions

Kokuro, under the dominance of Mindo, adopted moderate policies, seeking to improve the economic interests of union members within the framework of the PCNELR Law (Public Corporation and National Enterprise Labor Relations Law). The PCNELR Law formalized the government ordinance No.201 that banned strikes of public-sector workers, and was enacted in July 1949. The law permitted employees of public corporations such as JNR to form their union, to engage in collective bargaining, and to sign labor contracts with management, but prohibited them to engage in "a strike, slowdown or any other acts of disputes." The goal of the PCNELR Law was to establish stable industrial relations in the public-sector by making the militant JNR and other public-sector unions inactive through the deprivation of the right to strike and by establishing a tripartite commission as an alternative way to solve labor disputes (Endo 1981: 103). The tripartite commission set up by the PCNELR Law (Koroi) consisted of commissioners representing the public interests, public corporations, and employees, and provided three types of dispute resolution: Conciliation (Assen), non-binding arbitration (Chotei), and "final and binding" arbitration (Chusai) (Koshiro 1983: 272-3). Since Kokuro, under the dominance of Mindo, took the lawful approach in its wage struggles, it did not have any other means of pressing their wage demands except the arbitration system provided by the PCNELR Law. Thus, the acceptance by union members of Mindo's lawful approach depended on the smooth functioning of the arbitration system under the PCNELR Law.

However, the government did not cooperate in smooth implementation of arbitration awards. Between 1949 and 1957, there were 15 binding arbitration awards on wage increase from the PCNELR Commission, but the government fully complied only with three of them (Ujihara 1983: 154). The government justified its non-compliance based on Article 16 of the PCNELR Law that arbitration awards were not binding on the government if funds necessary for wage increase were not available in a budget of a public corporation or were not approved by the Diet (ibid.). The government, based on this justification, did not fully implement the first binding arbitration award made in December 1949, appropriating only 36 percent of the award (Takagi 1983: 86). The government did not fully comply with the second arbitration in March 1950, either.

Kokuro at first took lawful tactics to put pressure on the government to fully comply with binding arbitration awards. The union filed a lawsuit against the government and lobbied members of opposition parties in the Diet (Rodo Sogi Chosakai 1959: 170-1). In addition, 104 union members in 36 sub-units of locals staged hunger strikes in December 1949 in order to appeal to the public opinion (Ariga 1978: 327).

The government's failure to comply fully with binding arbitration awards exposed the limited effectiveness of lawful tactics. Kokuro, from the struggle for the full compliance of the second arbitration award in March 1950, expanded its interpretations of lawful tactics to include work-to-rule tactics, a refusal of overtime work, and mass leave-taking in factories owned by JNR (Rodo Sogi Chosakai 1959: 179).

The "escalation" of lawful tactics created tension between top union leaders committed to the principle of lawful tactics and some other leaders who realized the limit of such tactics. For example, Yokoyama Toshiaki, a member of the executive committee (Mindo) and the head of the planning section, proposed the mass leave-taking in two factories of JNR in December 1950. Hoshika Kaname, the vice president and one of the most influential leaders of Mindo, strongly opposed it, arguing that it would violate the principle of lawful tactics. Although Hoshika was eventually persuaded to approve the mass-leave taking, the disagreement between Yokoyama and Hoshika revealed the growing disunity within Mindo over union strategies (Murakami 1981: 332-3). On this disagreement over union strategies was superimposed anther, more serious, disagreement over the union's position in the Cold War politics.

(3-2) Mindo's Split over the Cold War Issues

Policy debate over the Cold War issues within Kokuro was fiercer than the debate over union strategies, and became a direct cause for the split of Mindo in the 10th union convention in June 1951. In the background of this debate was the adoption of "four peace principles" by the second convention of Sohyo in March 1951. The four peace principles were contained in one of the eleven sections of Sohyo's action platform, and stated " We will oppose the re-armament of Japan, and struggle for the peace and independence of Japan by insisting neutral foreign policy, opposition to foreign military bases in Japan, and an overall postwar peace treaty [i.e., a treaty with countries including the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China]." The Sohyo convention adopted the four peace principles over opposition of a minority of unions that supported the re-armament of Japan, accepted foreign military bases and Japan's alliance with Western countries (Sohyo 1964: 252-5). The adoption of the four principles, widely seen as a sign of the left-turn of Sohyo (Price 1991: 223)¹⁰, inevitably affected Kokuo's internal politics, because it was one of the major affiliates of the confederation.

Debate over the Cold War issues in Kokuro had started before the second Sohyo convention,¹¹ but had not developed into a divisive issue among union leaders until after the Sohyo convention. From April to May 1951, members of the executive committee engaged in a lengthy debate over a proposal of union policies to be submitted to the 10th convention. A group of leaders supported a proposal in favor of the four peace principles, while the other group supported a proposal for "a patriotic union movement" that opposed the four principles and advocated the peace treaty only with Western allies. These two proposals were called "the Yokoyama Plan" and "the Hoshika Plan," respectively, taking the names of their main proponents (Yokoyama Toshiaki and Hoshika Kaname). Both were affiliated with Mindo. The executive committee was evenly divided between the two proposals, but voted to submit the latter proposal to the union convention, because the chairman used a "double voting right" in favor of it. However, the convention rejected the proposal submitted by the executive committee (i.e., the Hoshika Plan), and adopted the Yokoyama Plan based on the four peace principles.¹² Observers pointed out that the Hoshika Plan was defeated by a wider margin than expected (Ariga 1978: 408).

The two proposals were similar in many policy areas, such as wages, working conditions, labor contract, and other economic issues (wage policies were almost identical). However, they were different in methods of struggles, and, more fundamentally, in the goals of the union movement. While the Hoshika plan emphasized lawful tactics as a method of struggles, the Yokoyama Plan did not mention lawful tactics and instead called for "the intensification of struggles in workplaces as well as regions under the direction of the central union leadership." Concerning the goals of the union movement, it can be argued that the difference between the two proposals boiled down to the question of whether a union movement should subordinate itself to a higher goal of national interests, or seek a union's own interests by engaging in class struggle. The Hoshika Plan gave top priority to Japan's independence, and, for that purpose, emphasized patriotism as a basic principle of a union movement (Toda 1952: 48).¹³ In contrast, the Yokoyama Plan emphasized the realization of a "true peace" through the democratization of Japan and the improvement of the status and living conditions of working class.

The internal division within Mindo thus became unbridgeable. Mindo held a caucus meeting during the 10th convention, and decided to dissolve itself. Then, supporters of the Hoshika Plan formed Shinsei Mindo (the re-born Mindo, hereafter Right Mindo), while supporters of the Yokoyama Plan formed a new faction called Mindo Saha (the left faction of Mindo, hereafter Left Mindo). In September 1951, Right Mindo held its first formal meeting, and issued a statement that presented the anti-Communist position of the faction's leaders. It declared that the mission of Right Mindo was to protect the freedom and democracy of people by confronting the international Communist forces. According to the statement, although Mindo had succeeded in purging Communists from Kokuro, the union leaned to the left again. This was because Communists increased their underground activities as the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan drew near, and used some "opportunists" (i.e., members of Left Mindo) as their "fifth column." Right Mindo criticized members of Left Mindo for engaging in "peace struggles" (i.e., their advocacy of the four peace principles), whose anti-U.S. orientation would benefit the interests of international Communist forces. It thus called for correcting the left leaning of Kokuro by brining it back onto the right track through the "democratization" of the union. With regard to the international union movement, Right Mindo took a pro-ICFTU position, showing its willingness to join the struggles that the ICFTU was waging with Communists (Kokutetsu 1961b: 164-5).

Leaders of Left Mindo were relatively young union officials and activists, and shared class-consciousness and a strong anti-war feeling. They were also alarmed by the red-baiting of Right Mindo, such as its equation of supporters of the four peace principles with the "fifth column of Communists" (Murakami 1981: 335-6, 391). In their statement, they criticized leaders of Right Mindo for taking pro-management and pro-capitalist policies in the name of anti-Communism, and strongly opposed the "patriotic" union movement of Right Mindo as serving the interests of those in power (Ibid.: 340-1). In the background of the advocacy for an independent, class-based union movement and the antipathy to the red-baiting lay a strong anti-war feeling held by leaders and supporters of the faction. It was based, not simply on an ideology of pacifism, but on their personal experiences of hardships during the Second World War. Their anti-war feeling seemed to be reinforced by the intensification of labor after the outbreak of the Korean War due to the rapid increase of military transportation for the U.S. forces (ibid.: 375). It seemed that leaders of Left Mindo treated struggles for a peace and class struggles as an inseparable whole.

The factional composition of a new executive committee elected by the 10th convention was dominated by Left Mindo. Among 35 members, 15 (43 percent), 8 (23 percent) , and 9 (26 percent) belonged to Left Mindo, Right Mindo, and Kakudo, respectively, while the remaining 3 members took a neutral position (Ariga 1978: 410). After the convention, Left Mindo and Kakudo formed a relatively stable "center-left" coalition in the union leadership, and re-directed the union into the militant direction.¹⁴ The influence of Right Mindo in the union, in contrast, declined thereafter. Right Mindo eventually split from Kokuro in the early 1960s to form its own union.

One may wonder how SCAP reacted to the left-turn of Kokuro as well as Sohyo. SCAP might have repressed Kokuro that turned to the left and started opposing the U.S. policy on Japan's independence, as it had done in the mass dismissal of 1949. It turned out that SCAP never took repressive measures against Sohyo and its affiliates such as Kokuro. This was because the labor division of SCAP gave implicit, if not explicit, consent to the left-turn of the confederation　(Price 1991: 223).¹⁵

(3-3) Analysis

With Mindo firmly in power in August 1949, the internal politics of Kokuro seemed to be stabilized. However, the external contexts of the union did not favor the stable dominance of the faction. This section pointed out two such contexts. First, institutional arrangements of public-sector industrial relations were not yet established. While the PCNELR Law banned JNR workers to strike, it provided the alternative system of dispute resolution, particularly on the issue of wage settlement. Had this system functioned smoothly, Kokuro might have recognized institutional arrangements of public-sector industrial relations under the PCNELR Law by refraining from engaging in strikes and other industrial actions. However, the union found it difficult to maintain economic unionism based on the lawful tactics due to the partial compliance of the government with binding arbitration awards. Since it was the government, rather than the JNR management, that overrode arbitration awards, Kokuro had to be political when it engaged in economic struggles. Thus, the union was caught in the dilemma between economic unionism and political unionism, and its leadership became divided over union strategies.

Second, the dilemma between economic unionism and political unionism was amplified by the disagreement over foreign policy issues. In contrast with the period covered in the previous section, foreign policy issues strongly influenced the discourse of union politics, because the national politics themselves were divided over Japan's position in the Cold War after its independence from the U.S. Occupation. Right Mindo increased its commitment to economic unionism by accepting the "realties" of international politics, while Left Mindo was committed even more to political unionism by challenging such "realities."

Leaders of Right Mindo, in spite of the subsequent decline in its influence, were optimistic about its future prospect. For example, Hoshika, in a press conference, stated with confidence that his faction would control 90 percent of union members (Ariga 1978: 411). It should be noted that his optimism was not unfounded. For example, the foreign policy advocated by Right Mindo was more realistic than that of Left Mindo. Although the JSP and Sohyo advocated an overall postwar treaty with countries including the Soviet Union and China, it was almost certain that Japan would sign a postwar peace treaty only with Western countries. This was because the U.S. allowed the independence of Japan only under the condition that it would be a pro-U.S., anti-Communist country (see Masamura 1990: 399), as well as because the balance of power in domestic politics was in favor of the forces that supported a military and political alliance between Japan and the United States.¹⁶ Thus, some delegates to the 10th convention of Kokuro addressed that they supported the policy proposal of Right Mindo, because the plan was "based on the reality" and "realizable" (Kokutetsu 1961b: 63-4).

In spite of its "realistic" stance in the Cold War politics, Right Mindo was not able to establish the dominance within Kokuro. This is because leaders of Right Mindo underestimated economic grievances of union members as well as their anti-war, pro-neutrality stance. Observers point out that many union members were indignant at the failure of the government to comply with binding arbitration awards, feeling that they were "betrayed" by the government (e.g., Murakami 1981: 263-4, 271-2). In other words, the economic grievances of union members were politicized. The politicization of economic issues was reinforced by the anti-war, pro-neutrality stance of union members. Although no opinion survey of union members is available, the wide margin by which the policy proposal based on the four peace principles was approved in the 10th union convention indicates that a large majority of union members took the anti-war, pro-neutrality stance.

(4) Conclusions

This paper examined the internal politics of Kokuro from 1947 to 1951, and showed that the Cold War influenced the trajectory of union politics. The period characterized by the direct confrontation between Communists and the anti-Communist Mindo and the pendulum-like movement between left and right was followed by that characterized by the dominance of Mindo and its split due to the increasing internal division over foreign policy issues. The paper showed that, while economic grievances of union members were an important factor for the volatile union politics and the eventual victory of Left Mindo, their political consciousness, particularly their anti-war feeling, also played an important role in the shifting balance of union politics.

The period covered by the paper was a critical juncture in the history of Kokuro, because union leaders engaged in policy debate over the fundamental direction of the union movement of JNR workers, and because the policy proposal of Left Mindo adopted in the 1951 convention formed the basis of the subsequent development of union policies. Throughout the 1950s and thereafter, Kokuro engaged in strikes in spite of the PCNELR Law, and played an important role as a key member of Sohyo in forming the so-called "postwar progressive forces" that advocated the neutrality of Japan and opposed the pro-U.S. conservative government.

The paper attempted to shed light on the relatively neglected area of labor research in Japan, internal union politics. Many previous studies treated unions as "unitary actors" that respond to their external contexts in a uniform way, and tended not to pay much attention to their internal political dynamics. This is largely because many studies of labor movements and industrial relations in Japan focused their attention to cooperative union-management relations in large private-sector firms in the context of stable industrial relations institutions since the early 1960s. However, as the case of Kokuro shows, unions were not necessarily unitary actors, and their internal political dynamics could influence the formation of policy orientations, particularly in the early postwar years when the Cold War had strong influence on the domestic politics.

References

Ariga, Sokichi (1978): Kokutetsu no Rosei to Rodo Undo (Labor Policies of JNR and Union Movement). Tokyo: Kotsu Kyoryoku Kai.

Endo, Shokichi (1954): "Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Rodo Kumiai (Kokutetsu)" (Japan National Railways Workers' Union), Kazuo Okochi ed. Nihon Rodo Kumiai Ron (the theory of Japanese labor unions). Tokyo: Yuhikaku.

Endo, Koshi (1981): "1950 Nendai No Kokuro Bunkai Katsudo" (Activities of Kokuro's workplace sub-unit in the 1950s) in Satoshi Ohara ed. Nihon Roshikankei no Gendankai (the present stage of the Japanese industrial relations). Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo.

Kokuro (1967): Kokutetsu Rodo Kumiai 20 Nenshi (the 20 year history of Kokuro). Tokyo: Rodo Junpo Sha.

Kokutetsu (1959): Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Rodo Undoshi (Shiryo), Dai 3 Shu (Materials of the union movement of JNR workers, Vol.3). Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Shokuin Kyoku (Labor Section of JNR).

Kokutetsu (1960): Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Rodo Undoshi (Shiryo), Dai 5 Shu, Showa 24 Nendo (Materials of the union movement of JNR workers, Vol.5, 1949). Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Shokuin Kyoku (Labor Section of JNR).

Kokutetsu (1961a): Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Rodo Undoshi (Shiryo), Dai 6 Shu, Showa 25 Nendo (Materials of the union movement of JNR workers, Vol.6, 1950). Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Shokuin Kyoku (Labor Section of JNR).

Kokutetsu (1961b): Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Rodo Undoshi (Shiryo), Dai 7 Shu, Showa 26 Nendo (Materials of the union movement of JNR workers, Vol.7, 1951). Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Shokuin Kyoku (Labor Section of JNR).

Koshiro, Kazutoshi (1983): "Labor Relations in Public Enterprises," Tashiro Shirai ed., Contemporary Industrial Relations in Japan. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.

Masamura, Kimihiro (1990): Sengo Shi (Jo) (The postwar History Vol.1). Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.

Murakami, Kanji (1981): Kokuro Undoushi no Nakano Hitoboto (People in the history of Kokuro). Tokyo: Heigen Sha.

Price, John (1991): "Valery Burati and the Formation of Sohyo during the U.S. Occupation of Japan" Pacific Affairs. Vol.62, No.2: 208-225.

Rodo Sogi Chosakai (1959): Kokutetsu Sogi (Labor disputes in JNR). Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha.

Sohyo (1964): Sohyo 10nen Shi (the 10 year history of Sohyo). Tokyo: Rodo Junpo Sha.

Takagi, Ikuro (1983): "Kokutetsu No Roshi Kankei Shi to Genjo" (the history and the present condition of labor relations in JNR) Jurist Rinji Zokan Tokyshu (No.31).

Takemae, Eiji (1982): Sengo Rodo Kaikaku (Postwar Labor Reform). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.

Toda, Yoshio (1952): "Kokutetsu Shinsei Mindo no Igi to Ninmu" (the meaning and mission of JNR Shinsei Mindo) in Dokuritsugo no Rodo Undo: Kokutetsu Shinsei Mindo no Mokuhyo (the labor movement after Japan's independence: the purpose of Shinsei Mindo). Tokyo : Nikkan Rodo Tsushin Sha.

Ujihara, Shojiro (1983): "Kokyo Kigyotai to Roshi Funso no Seikaku" (Characteristics of public-sector labor disputes) in T. Kurokawa et. al. eds. Rodo Kumiai Undo No Gendaiteki Kadai (the contemporary issue of the labor movement). Tokyo: Miraisha.

ENDNOTES

1 This section is based on Kokuro (1967) and Ariga (1978).

2 Unless specified otherwise, this section is based on Kokuro (1967).

3 John Price points out that SCAP's secret document "Program for Counteracting Communists Activities in the Japanese Labor Movement" (dated June 1947) marked the beginning of its program to "systematically eliminate Communists or radical influence in the unions." The program aimed to provide assistance to anti-Communists groups within labor unions so that unions themselves would perform "the basic task of cleansing unions of undemocratic tendencies" (Price 1991: 211-2).

4 The central committee was a decision-making body when a union convention was not in session. Its members were directly elected by union members until 1956.

5SCAP was not unanimous in deciding to restrict public-sector workers' industrial rights. While GS (Government Section) supported the severe restriction of the industrial rights of public-sector workers, ESS (Economic and Scientific Section) opposed such restriction. One of disagreements between the two sections was whether the severe restriction of the industrial rights would weaken the influence of Communists in public-sector unions or would have counter-productive effects (Takemae 1982: 228-9).

6 The disunity of the union deepened when protest movements over the deprivation of industrial rights started in some regions. About 1,500 young workers, angered by the sudden deprivation of industrial rights as well as by harsh working conditions, engaged in virtual strikes by leaving their jobs. It was suspected that Communists stirred up these young workers. The protest movements met severe repression from the government and the JNR management. The police issued arrest warrants to 1,078 workers, and 978 workers were dismissed (Ariga 1978: 214). Although Mindo accepted the dismissal of those who were arrested by the police, Communists and Kakudo insisted that the union should get a promise of no dismissal from management. The three factions eventually reached an agreement to prevent the further spread of protest movements, because Communists softened their position (Ariga 1978: 220-1).

7In addition to Communists and other leftists, female employees were heavily targeted in the mass dismissal. Many female blue-collar workers were working in JNR, because they had been mobilized into JNR during the war. While 15 percent of male employees (about 82,000) were dismissed, 40 percent of female workers (about 13,000) were dismissed.

8 Mitaka Incident occurred in July 15. A train started running without a motorman at Mitaka Station and crashed into a house near the railway track, killing 6 people and injuring 19 people. Matsukawa Incident occurred in August 17. 3 crewmen of a freight train were killed when the train was derailed and overturned near Matsukawa Station on Tohoku Line. 21 JNR workers (including those who had been dismissed) were arrested as suspects of the two incidents. Many of the arrested JNR workers were Communists. Later, all but one JNR workers were found innocent. In addition to these incidents, Shimoyama Incident occurred in July 5. The president of JNR, Shimoyama Sadanori, was found dead on the railway track near Ayase Station in Tokyo. The cause of his death remains mysterious. This incident was also seen as another factor dampening the militancy of JNR workers.

9 Unless specified otherwise, this section is based on Kokuro (1967).

10 Another sign of the left-turn was that the second convention decided that Sohyo would not be affiliated with the ICFTU en bloc.

11 The eighth convention of Kokuro in June-July 1950 adopted "the neutrality of Japan based on an overall peace treaty and opposition to war" as one of its policies. In its ninth convention in October 1950, Hoshika Kaname (the vice president) addressed that the union should be patriotic and cooperate with the government in providing assistance to the UN Forces fighting the Korean War. Yokoyama Toshiaki (the head of the planning section) criticized Hoshika's pro-UN stance for violating the union policy (Ariga 1978: 365-6). Delegates then engaged in a policy debate over the pro-neutrality policy, with a minority of delegates arguing that such a policy was unrealistic and should be deleted from union policies. However, the debate did not develop into a major division, and the convention decided to maintain the pro-neutrality policy by the vote of 335 to 89 (Kokutetsu 1961a: 227-8).

12 292 delegates voted for the Yokoyama Plan, while 113 delegates voted for the Hoshika Plan. Supporters of the Yokoyama Plan included delegates of Kakudo.

13 Note that the "independence" in this context is the independence of Japan as a member of Western allies. Also note that the word "patriotism" (Aikoku) used by Hoshika was a politically-sensitive word in Japanese. Many people associated it with the militarism during the second world war.

14 After the split of Mindo in 1951, Kokuro, under the leadership dominated by Left Mindo, took tactics called "jitsuryoku koshi" (literally "the use of force") to put pressure on the government to fully implement the arbitration awards. For example, the union leadership designated workplaces, and gave union members there orders to hold shopfloor meetings during work hours, to engage in work-to-rule tactics, and (for 20-30 union members) to take leave at the same time. Such tactics affected actual train operations, and the union began to virtually violate the PCNELR Law (Takagi 1983).

15 The labor policy of SCAP partly reflected a rivalry between CIO and AFL over the re-organization of the Japanese labor movement. Valery Burati, acting chief of the Labor Division of SCAP from 1948 to 1951, played an important role in the formation of Sohyo. Burati, a former organizer of the CIO-affiliated textile workers' union, was disturbed by the conservative company unionism and the politically reactionary tendencies of Sodomei (the Japan Federation of Labor, a rival confederation of Sanbetsu Kaigi), much more than the threat of Communism to the labor movement. AFL supported Sodomei, and tried to subvert the plan of Burati to exclude rightist leaders of Sodomei, such as Matsuoka Komakichi (the president of Sodomei), from the formation process of Sohyo. However, the attempt of AFL did not succeed (Price 1991; Takemae 1982).

16 In September 1951, Japan signed a postwar peace treaty with 49 countries. These countries were allies of the United States, and did not include Eastern bloc countries such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.